Europe isn’t prepared to defend itself, and trust between it and the U.S. is at an all-time low, says expert
“The European members of NATO make up the third wealthiest economic block on the planet, and yet they are incapable of wielding military forces on their own that could defend their own continent against Russia,” says Jeff Taliaferro. Here, NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. Photo: Shutterstock
The latest episode in the ongoing deterioration of relations between the United States and Europe came a few weeks ago, with U.S. threats to take over Greenland, an autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark. Denmark’s prime minister said “Europe won’t be blackmailed” by tariff threats over Greenland.
Denmark has been a member of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, since its inception. Other European NATO countries decried the U.S. move, and reports of the impending death of the U.S.-European alliance have been in the news.
NATO was formed in the wake of World War II, as the Cold War was beginning and European countries looked to the U.S. for security guarantees. It also served the interests of the U.S., says Jeff Taliaferro, professor and chair of political science, and author of Defending Frenemies: Alliance Politics and Nonproliferation in U.S. Foreign Policy.
Despite the current strain in relations, “I don’t see the United States divorcing itself or dramatically pulling out of Europe anytime soon. But nonetheless, the trust between leaders has been shattered,” he says.
Tufts Now spoke with Taliaferro to learn about the history and prospects of NATO and U.S.-European relations.
Why was NATO started in the first place?
“One would have thought that Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 would have been a wake-up call, and that the Europeans would have systematically started to reinvest in their defense, but they didn’t,” says Jeff Taliaferro. Photo: Michael Last
In the late 1940s, the British, French, Dutch, and Belgians wanted the United States to make a permanent security commitment to the continent. That led to the North Atlantic Treaty, which created NATO.
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 began the process of transforming NATO from a paper treaty to a highly institutionalized alliance. NATO was always intended to be a military alliance that was designed to deter an attack by the Soviet Union on Western and Central Europe, especially West Germany. For the United States to make its security guarantees to Western Europe credible, it had to deploy conventional and nuclear forces to the continent.
Who was going to pay for NATO—was it always supposed to be the U.S.?
The idea was that once the European states had an opportunity to rebuild their shattered economies, they would pick up a more equitable portion of the burden of self-defense, but that never really happened.
Successive U.S. presidents and secretaries of defense going all the way back to Dwight Eisenhower would harangue the Europeans about burden sharing, about the need for them to spend more on their defense. And the Europeans would always hem and haw and make noises and never really do it to the satisfaction of the United States.
When the Cold War ended in 1989, the administration of George H.W. Bush decided to perpetuate NATO. The alliance grew from 16 member states in 1989 to now having 33 member states, adding basically all the states of the former Warsaw Pact and three former Soviet republics: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
Did NATO’s expansion change the dynamics?
The expansion didn’t solve any of the real problems built into the alliance regarding burden sharing. The new members who are on the front line, states like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, had every incentive to contribute disproportionately to the collective defense because they were getting most of the benefit.
“If I were Germany right now, I would be very afraid, because on the one hand you share a continent with revanchist Russia, and on the other your defense ties are with the United States, which has shown itself to be quite erratic and unreliable, especially under this president.”
But Britain, France, and Germany slashed their defense budgets, downsized their militaries, got rid of conscription, systematically underinvested in their military, and let their defense industries wither away, so that they were entirely reliant on American military hardware and now military software.
The European members of NATO, many of whom are also members of the European Union, make up the third wealthiest economic block on the planet, and yet they are incapable of wielding military forces on their own that could defend their own continent against Russia.
What has the U.S. gotten out of NATO?
It gave the United States forward bases from which to project military force to the Middle East and South Asia. In the not-too-distant memory, then-Secretary of State Madeline Albright used to say the United States was the indispensable power, meaning that it was the only country that was capable of projecting and sustaining military operations on the global scale, and that there was simply no one who could stop the United States from doing that.
The United States also benefited from a favorable set of trading arrangements with its allies. It insisted on market openings around the world.
With Russian aggression against Ukraine, how has Europe responded?
One would have thought that Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 would have been a wake-up call, and that the Europeans would have systematically started to reinvest in their defense, but they didn’t.
And one would’ve thought that the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine would have been a wake-up call. Yes, Europe, especially Germany, did wean itself off Russian oil and natural gas, but at the same time, they never engaged in the gut-wrenching type of debate about how they could provide security for themselves.
Germany, for example, has a very generous welfare state that may no longer be sustainable. They may have to invest billions of euros into building up a German defense industry or a pan-European defense industry. But that really didn’t happen until the second Trump administration came into office. And even now, they’re just at the talking stage.
How have they responded to the Trump administration’s dismissal of European concerns?
The second Trump administration created an existential crisis for Europe. They face a president of the United States who isn’t just complaining about European freeriding but is actively hostile to Europe. He’s surrounded by people who are dismissive of Europe—culturally, ideologically, and strategically.
If I were Germany right now, I would be very afraid, because on the one hand you share a continent with revanchist Russia, and on the other your defense ties are with the United States, which has shown itself to be quite erratic and unreliable, especially under this president.
Would that change with a new U.S. president in the future?
Even when this president leaves office, I don’t think anyone with any common sense should proceed on the assumption that this is just an aberration. We’re not going to go back to the status quo pre-2016. That world no longer exists.
“Within the European Union, the states have very different threat perceptions. For Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, Russia is an omnipresent, existential threat. For Ireland, for Portugal, not so much so.”
The United States has been changed by the past decade of Donald Trump, and United States relations with the rest of the world have changed due to the policies that he has pursued and the way that the rest of the world has reacted to those.
If I were a European prime minister or defense minister, would I trust the United States again, even if a Democrat came to the presidency in 2029 or 2033? No, I wouldn’t. I would be a fool to do that. But at the same time, I can’t afford an overt rupture, because what am I going to do in the short run? I’m still dependent on the United States for the F-16 and the F-35. I’m still dependent on them in the short run for drone technologies.
Where does that leave Europe?
The conundrum that Europeans face is that in the short term, they can’t afford to completely go it alone. They don’t have an indigenous defense industry. And while perhaps the frontline states like Poland that actually invest in their defense, and the wealthier ones like Germany and France, might be able to do something militarily, that’s the limit.
Within the European Union, the 27 or so different states have very different threat perceptions. For Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, Russia is an omnipresent, existential threat. For Ireland, for Portugal, not so much so.
It leaves Europe in a very precarious position. The Europeans will muddle through, just like the Americans will muddle through somehow.
Are there any consequences for the U.S. in that breakdown in trust?
Yes, there are. They’re indirect and they’re not particularly good. The next time a president of the United States decides to go to war abroad and goes looking for allies to legitimate that military operation and contribute forces, I don’t think you’re going to find very many European takers.
The economic ramifications could be significant. Europeans hold a lot of U.S. sovereign debt. They could begin to quietly sell U.S. securities, not all at once, but very quietly begin to diversify their portfolios, which in the long run could increase borrowing costs for the U.S. Treasury.
